Economic crisis, poor governance and the rise of populism: the case of Greece by Halikiopoulou, Daphne
Economic crisis, poor governance and the  
rise of populism: the case of Greece 
Article 
Published Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY) 
Open access 
Halikiopoulou, D. (2020) Economic crisis, poor governance 
and the rise of populism: the case of Greece. Intereconomics: 
Review of European Economic Policy, 55 (1). pp. 34-37. ISSN 
1613-964X doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-020-0866-4 
Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/88850/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Published version at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10272-020-0866-4?
wt_mc=Internal.Event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst&utm_source=ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst&utm_medium=email&utm
_content=AA_en_06082018&ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst_20200131 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10272-020-0866-4 
Publisher: Springer 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Intereconomics 2020 | 1
34
Forum
Daphne Halikiopoulou
Economic Crisis, Poor Governance and the Rise of Populism: The 
Case of Greece
Daphne Halikiopoulou, University of Reading, UK.
The eurozone crisis has become associated with the rise 
of populism across Europe as it has coincided with in-
creasing electoral support for political actors who seek to 
return politics back to ‘the people’. This has taken place 
in different forms, depending on whether the country was 
a debtor or creditor, the salience of cultural and/or eco-
nomic cleavages and other contextual factors.
Right-wing and left-wing populism in Europe
In most instances, particularly in Western Europe, the 
populist actors that enjoyed increasing electoral sup-
port came from the right of the political spectrum. These 
are parties that deﬁ ne the people on the basis of an in-
group/out-group dimension, and emphasise the need to 
‘take back control’ and restore national sovereignty. They 
identify the people with the in-group and suggest that this 
group should be exclusively granted access to the col-
lective goods of the state. As such, the signature theme 
of right-wing populists is limiting immigration. Examples 
abound: the French Rassemblement National (RN – for-
merly Front National), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), 
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the Alternative for Ger-
many (AfD), the Sweden Democrats (SD) and the Danish 
People’s Party (DF) have all fared well electorally in their 
respective arenas. What these parties have in common 
beyond their immigration skepticism is their conscious 
effort to distance themselves from the violence, fascism 
and extremism that deﬁ ned the far right in the past in or-
der to broaden their electoral appeal.
Less frequently, and predominantly in Southern Europe 
where economic cleavages remain salient, successful 
populist forces have originated from the left of the politi-
cal spectrum. Left-wing populism deﬁ nes the people on 
the basis of a have and have-not dimension and empha-
sises equality and redistribution. A good example is the 
Spanish party Podemos.
Greece is in many ways an exceptional case because, 
subsequent to the eruption of the economic crisis, it expe-
rienced the rise of both types of populism. During the May 
and June 2012 elections, small anti-establishment par-
ties from both sides of the political spectrum increased 
their electoral support, including the extreme right Golden 
Dawn, the radical right Independent Greeks (Anel) and the 
Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza). Greece also diverg-
es from Western European patterns with regards to the 
Golden Dawn’s extremism and violence, which contrary 
to other far right actors in Europe increased its represen-
tation because of, and not despite, its extremism.
This article focuses on the Greek case, in an attempt to 
shed light on its exceptionalism. Its aim is threefold. First, 
to present a brief theoretical discussion of populism and 
place Greece within this framework; second, to focus on 
the rise of the Golden Dawn, which is one of the few Eu-
ropean – and the only Western European – extreme right-
wing parties to enjoy parliamentary representation; and 
third, to place this phenomenon within an explanatory 
framework that extends beyond the economic crisis to 
the role of state institutions and governance.
Deﬁ ning populism
Most deﬁ nitions of populism centre on its emphasis on the 
people and its attempt to mobilise the ‘masses’ against a 
purported enemy by drawing on a dichotomy between the 
‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’.1 While the focus on 
the people is a descriptor of populist parties, it does not 
necessarily tell us something analytical about populism. 
After all, who in a democracy does not speak about the 
people, to the people and on behalf of the people to some 
extent? What is also important about populism is the ex-
tent to which it places the people at the heart of collective 
decision-making.2
According to populists, collective decisions must be 
made from below: only decisions made by ‘the people’ 
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2000, Open University Press.
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are legitimate and morally superior. In other words, the 
key feature of populism is that it seeks to bypass repre-
sentative institutions in the name of the ‘popular will’.3 The 
implications are paramount: beyond just the communi-
cation style, ideology or strategy that parties adopt, it is 
a system of governance – an alternative vision of demo-
cratic society that such parties seek to implement.4 This 
vision downplays institutions and idealises the ‘will of the 
people’, which it portrays as an indivisible entity,5 failing to 
acknowledge the existence of different social groups and 
the need for reconciliation of their often clashing prefer-
ences.6
In sum, populism is a form of politics because ultimately it 
puts forward a vision about how societies should be mak-
ing, legitimating and implementing collective choices.7 
Populism has the following characteristics:
• a ﬂ amboyant rhetoric that often seeks to attribute 
blame to those not identiﬁ ed as ‘the people’
• the portrayal of the people as an indivisible entity
• adversarial politics and polarisation
• a hostility towards liberal democracy and the institu-
tions that secure its procedures; and hence
• a propensity towards authoritarianism.
Populism in Greece
Whereas across Western Europe, the salience of an 
emerging cultural cleavage has triggered the rise of right-
wing populist parties that focus on immigration, in Greece 
the salience of the materialist cleavage exacerbated by 
the country’s severe and protracted economic crisis gave 
rise to populist forces of both the right and the left. The 
Greek economic crisis of 2009 was soon followed by a 
political crisis, as the country’s two-party system that 
had dominated Greek politics since the restoration of 
democracy in 1974 imploded. The post-crisis elections 
were characterised by the near collapse of the centre-left 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), which voters 
associated directly with the crisis. Support for the party 
dropped from 43.9% in 2009 to 12.3% in June 2012 and 
3 M. F re e d e n : After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as 
an ideology, in: Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2017, 
pp. 1-11; D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u : Right-wing Populism as a Nationalist 
Vision of Legitimating Collective Choice: A Supply-side Perspective, 
in: The International Spectator, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2019, pp. 35-49; B. 
B o n i k o w s k i , D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , E. K a u f m a n n , M. R o o d u i j n : 
Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly 
exchange, in: Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 25, No. 1,  2019, pp. 58-
81. 
4 W. R i k e r, op. cit.
5 M. F re e d e n , op. cit.
6 D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , op. cit.
7 B. B o n i k o w s k i , D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , E. K a u f m a n n , M. R o o d u i -
j n , op. cit.
4.7% in January 2015. Centre-right New Democracy (ND), 
which has been in power alternately with Pasok for the 
past 40 years also declined because of its association 
with austerity and harsh economic measures.
In January 2015, Greece elected a government with a 
clear anti-austerity mandate, consisting of a radical left-
radical right coalition between Syriza and Anel. ND came 
second with just over 27.8% of the vote. The result was a 
landslide for Syriza, which attracted broad support from 
voters who punished mainstream parties – especially 
Pasok – for their failure to manage the effects of the crisis. 
Support for the party soared from 4.6% in 2009 to 26.9% 
in June 2012, and 36.3% in 2015. Syriza won the election 
on a left-wing populist narrative that attributed blame to 
outside exploitative powers and their collaborators and 
sought to restore sovereignty back to the Greek people. 
Anel, an offshoot of ND, received 4.8% of the vote by also 
campaigning on a populist platform.
Indeed, while unlikely bedfellows for many, Syriza and 
Anel shared a populist narrative based on their anti-aus-
terity stance. Their rise is indicative of the rise of a type of 
populism in Greece that was adopted by most parties in 
the system in an attempt to divert political accountabil-
ity through populist blame-shifting.8 While left- and right-
wing populist parties were divided on key social issues, 
including religion and immigration – for example, the Mac-
edonian question, Cyprus, and Greece’s relationship with 
Turkey – they still shared a nationalist rhetoric of libera-
tion, restoration of national sovereignty, a strong rejection 
of external involvement and resistance to foreign domi-
nation.9
In sum, the type of populism that emerged in Greece as 
a response to the economic crisis has four key features:
1. It was expressed through the narratives of all political 
actors;
2. Therefore, it was observed across the party system;
3. It was expressed in the forms of blame-shifting and ex-
clusivity; and
4. It differed depending on ideology and position in the 
party system.10
8 S. Va s i l o p o u l o u , D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , T. E x a d a k t y l o s : Greece 
in crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame, in: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2014, pp. 388-402.
9 D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , S. Va s i l o p o u l o u : Greece’s response to aus-
terity has been to say “no to the Fourth Reich” but yes to the neo-Na-
zism of the Golden Dawn, LSE EUROPP Blog, 2012, available at htt-
ps://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/10/15/greece-golden-dawn/.
10 S. Va s i l o p o u l o u , D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , T. E x a d a k t y l o s , op. cit.
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Year Election type Percentage Seats
1994 EP 0.11 0
1996 National 0.07 0
2009 EP 0.46 0
2009 National 0.29 0
May 2012 National 6.97 21
June 2012 National 6.92 18
2014 EP 9.39 3
January 2015 National 6.28 17
Sepember 2015 National 6.99 18
2019 EP 4.87 2
2019 National 2.93 0
The Golden Dawn: Extreme right-wing populism?
What is also distinct about Greece is the rise of the Golden 
Dawn, an extremist, violent, ultra-nationalist and openly 
neo-Nazi party which progressed from limited member-
ship of extreme right-wing activists, predominantly street 
activities and very low levels of electoral support in the 
1990s and early 2000s to capturing just under 7% in 2015 
(Table 1).
This rise of the Golden Dawn contradicts the European-
wide pattern of far right populism. In most European 
countries, the most successful radical right-wing parties 
are those that have sought to disassociate themselves 
from extremism such as the French RN, the Dutch PVV, 
the Swiss SVP, the German AfD and the Scandinavian 
SD and DF. These parties share a common narrative that 
emphasises ideological rather than biological criteria of 
national belonging, adopting a seemingly more inclusive 
form of nationalism11 and distancing themselves from fas-
cism.12
Furthermore, the Golden Dawn is not only openly violent 
and racist, but for most of the post-crisis period its lead-
ing cadres have been standing trial for charges including 
maintaining a criminal organisation, murder and griev-
ous bodily harm. While it might be argued that extremist 
parties such as the Golden Dawn cannot be classiﬁ ed as 
populist, I argue that in fact what characterises the party’s 
rhetoric is a clear merger of populism and nationalism. 
This is because of:
• Its emphasis on the legitimacy of politics carried out 
from below, which is a key feature of populism as dis-
cussed above; and
• The adoption of a ‘palingenetic myth’ of populist ultra-
nationalism that allows the party to present itself as the 
saviour of the Greek nation and defender of the nation-
al mission.13
Speciﬁ cally, while the party rejects the ‘fascist label’, it 
actually espouses all core fascist principles in its supply-
side materials. This entails an endorsement of politics 
from below. For example, the Golden Dawn presents its 
leader not as the representative but as the embodiment 
11 D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , S. M o c k , S. Va s i l o p o u l o u : The civic zeit-
geist: nationalism and liberal values in the European radical right, in: 
Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2013, pp. 107-127.
12 M. G o l d e r : Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right 
Parties in Western Europe, in: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, 
No. 4, 2003, pp. 432-466.
13 S. Va s i l o p o u l o u , D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u : The Golden Dawn’s nation-
alist Solution: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece, New York 
2015, Palgrave.
of the Greek people and their collective will. In addition, 
the Golden Dawn espouses the ‘third biggest ideology in 
history’, i.e. nationalism and supports the establishment 
of the state in accordance with this principle, placing an 
extensive emphasis on the Nation (which it refers to with 
capital ‘N’). By employing the twin fascism myths of social 
decadence and national rebirth, the Golden Dawn prom-
ised disillusioned Greek voters a nationalist solution to all 
their socio-economic problems.14 It has done so through 
a narrative that presents Europe as a problem of national 
exploitation and draws heavily on Greek history, the dis-
tinction between superior and inferior nations, the strong 
sense of Greek ethnic superiority and the portrayal of the 
Greek nation under threat.
The comparative dimension: Poor governance
How is it possible that a country which prides itself on 
having resisted fascism and authoritarianism during WWII 
and the junta years (1967-1973), became one of the few 
European cases with an openly neo-Nazi party in parlia-
ment? Extensive work carried out on Golden Dawn vot-
ing patterns and supply-side materials suggests that the 
economic crisis alone is insufﬁ cient in explaining this out-
come.15
A brief comparative examination illustrates why other 
Southern European countries, with a similar history of 
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.; D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , S. Va s i l o p o u l o u : Breaching the social 
contract: crises of democratic representation and patterns of extreme 
right party support, in: Government and Opposition, Vol. 53, No. 1, 
2018, pp. 26-50.
Table 1
Election results of the Golden Dawn
S o u rc e : Greek Ministry of Interior, www.ypes.gr.
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authoritarianism and comparable indicators of eco-
nomic malaise such as unemployment and declining 
GDP, did not experience a similar phenomenon. This in-
cludes Spain, whose crisis coincided with the populist left 
Podemos, and later the populist right Vox – which how-
ever does not compare to the Golden Dawn in terms of 
its espousal of fascism and violence; and Portugal, which 
despite a severe economic predicament did not experi-
ence a populism wave.
What differs between these cases is the nature rather than 
the intensity of the crisis.16 The economic crisis in Greece 
– as opposed to that in Spain and Portugal – ultimately 
culminated in a crisis of democracy and political repre-
sentation as Greek citizens perceived the state as unable 
to mitigate the recession. This may be attributed to the 
weakness of the country’s institutions and the deeply en-
trenched clientelistic networks that permeated all aspects 
of social and political life in Greece since the restoration 
of democracy. This system may have facilitated some de-
velopment during times of international ﬁ nancial stability, 
but also meant that the country was unable to withstand 
external shocks.17 Severe issues of governability resulting 
from these arrangements signiﬁ cantly impacted the abil-
ity of the state to fulﬁ l its obligations to citizens and were 
accompanied by declining levels of trust in state institu-
tions, resulting in a party system collapse.18 
This suggests that the rise of the Golden Dawn is closely 
related to the breakdown of political trust, good govern-
ance and the perceived efﬁ cacy of the state. Ultimately, 
Golden Dawn’s success needs to be understood as de-
pendent upon the extent to which it was able to propose 
plausible solutions to the three sets of crises – economic, 
political and ideological – that befell Greece and culmi-
nated in an overall crisis of democracy.19
How resilient is Greece’s populism?
According to many analysts and commentators, the July 
2019 elections in Greece marked ‘a return to normality’20 
16 Previously stated in ibid.
17 M. M i t s o p o u l o s , T. P e l a g i d i s : Understanding the Crisis in 
Greece: From Boom to Bust, Basingstoke 2011, Palgrave Macmillan; 
T. P a p p a s : Why Greece Failed, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 24, 
No. 2, 2013, pp. 31-45; S. Va s i l o p o u l o u , D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , T. 
E x a d a k t y l o s , op. cit.
18 D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u , S. Va s i l o p o u l o u :: Breaching the social con-
tract. . . , op. cit.
19 S. Va s i l o p o u l o u , D. H a l i k i o p o u l o u ,  2015, op. cit.
20 H. M y l o n a s : After a decade of crisis, Greek politics are turning nor-
mal and more technocratic’, Washington Post, 14th July 2019.
and ‘ﬁ rst defeat of populism in Europe’.21 The populist left 
Syriza lost the election to the centre-right New Democra-
cy party, which won with 39.85% of the popular vote and 
158 seats from a total of 300. The Golden Dawn received 
2.93%, failing to pass the 3% threshold, exiting the Greek 
parliament after seven years. The result of this election 
may be understood as an illustration of the need for sta-
bility, as the Greek electorate opted for a technocratic, as 
opposed to openly populist, government, deemed efﬁ -
cient to handle the economy.
However, such analyses may be premature and should 
be treated with caution. Greece’s illiberal democracy – 
deﬁ ned by adversarial politics, the adoption of populist 
narratives across the party system and weak democratic 
institutions governed by rent-seeking behaviour – poses 
signiﬁ cant constraints on the possibility for success-
ful reform.22 A brief look at the country’s political scene 
since July 2019 illustrates this empirically. First, while the 
Golden Dawn exited parliament, other populist forces 
still enjoy parliamentary representation, for example the 
populist right Greek Solution (ten seats) and the populist 
left MeRa25 (nine seats). Second, the development of the 
protracted Golden Dawn trial shows signs of reluctance 
to attribute signiﬁ cant criminal activity to the party and its 
leading cadres. Third, there are already signs of increas-
ing discontent as New Democracy initiatives become 
linked to increasing conservatism – for example with re-
gards to the role of the church, abortion and other social 
issues.
All this suggests that underlying systemic problems in 
Greece persist and pose a test for the current and any 
subsequent governments facing a similar constraint: how 
to implement structural reforms while not compromising 
their own position in the status quo by alienating large 
sections of the population who have beneﬁ ted structur-
ally from the existing system. This ultimately can only be 
done through the establishment of resilient democratic 
institutions that can offer effective checks and balances 
and counter-populism on a structural level. Without these, 
populism remains a likely destabilising force.
21 T. P e l a g i d i s : The First defeat of populism in Europe?, Brookings, 
10 July 2019, available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2019/07/10/greek-elections-the-first-defeat-of-populism-in-
europe/. 
22 T. P a p p a s , op. cit.
